primary role is for industry, which is why we have asked the Creative Industries IP Forum to advise us on this. 4 We may note here that the Creative Industries Forum on Intellectual Property is a cross-Government body (including the devolved administrations and also industry representatives), set up by DCMS in July 2004. The Forum's task was to consider how best to meet the "opportunities and threats that rapid (2004) , both accessible at http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/doc_WTD002766.html.
 The establishment of Creative Commons UK (building on a US
model), with the aim of developing forms of licence under which copyright is retained but users are given advance permission to copy and distribute the work for their own purposes so long as due credit is given to the original work; this being, it is argued, the most appropriate way to support and encourage creativity and innovation in the on-line and digital environments. 9 not helped by the further perception that copyright is in fact widely flaunted, whether deliberately or ignorantly, or, amongst those minded to comply if they can (such as academics), as a result of practical inability to find out whether copyright exists in a given piece of work and, if so, who its owner is.
A huge range of areas of activity is affected by copyright -government, entertainment, education, creativity, technology and international development, to name but a few. As the short list of major issues given above suggests, much of the current debate has arisen in the context of the ever-expanding scope and possibilities of digital, wireless and mobile technologies for the creation, dissemination and reproduction of ideas, information and entertainment. The ability to make material available so that it is potentially always accessible to users at times and places chosen by them, along with expanding possibilities of, and demand for, interactivity between suppliers and users, has transformed the context for policy thinking in the areas traditionally covered by copyright.
So the need for reform is apparent -but it is not necessarily the case that the "primary role" in developing this reform should be for industry. Indeed, as Jessica Litman has pointed out from the US experience of copyright law-making, By the 1920s, the process was sufficiently entrenched that whenever a member of Congress came up with a legislative proposal without going through the cumbersome prelegislative process of multiparty negotiation, the affected industries united to block the bill. Copyright bills passed only after private stakeholders agreed with one another on their substantive provisions. The pattern has continued to this day.
A process like this generates legislation with some predictable features.
First of all, no affected party is going to agree to support a bill that leaves it worse off than it is under current law. … Second, there's a premium on characterizing the state of current law to favour one's own position, since current law is the baseline against which proposals are negotiated. … Third, the way these things tend to get settled in the real world is by 16 Note that Litman had already set out much more detailed arguments on these issues in 'Copyright, Compromise and Legislative History ' (1987) This last phrase leads Litman to her most potent objection to the reform process she is describing:
The need to balance concessions in order to achieve agreement, of course, imposes constraints on the sort of legislation that is likely to emerge from the process. Unless the participants become convinced that the new legislation gives them no fewer benefits than they currently enjoy, they are likely to press for additional concessions. It must therefore be expected that any successful copyright legislation will confer advantages on many of the interests involved in hammering it out, and that these advantages will probably come at some absent party's expense. … It is the seeming inevitability of bias against absent interests, and of narrow compromises with no durability, that makes such a process so costly.
Each time we rely on current stakeholders to agree on a statutory scheme they produce a scheme designed to protect themselves against the rest of Copyright Tribunal jurisdiction and procedure; or the rules about qualification for protection), to statutory instruments (which should themselves nevertheless also be orderly, principled and accessible to those whom they affect). In all probability, such a short Copyright Act ought to be produced for the European Union, and not just for the United Kingdom. But there is no reason why the United Kingdom 23 See further below, 000.
cannot take an initiative in this area, especially when the reforms in the air already envisage some form of European codification as an ultimate goal.
Such an initiative should not be undertaken, however, without careful preliminary consideration of the nature of the exercise upon which one is embarking. The remainder of this paper highlights two issues which would go to the heart of a recodification or restatement of copyright, namely the underlying fundamental policies or purposes of the law and the definition of the zone for copyright in relation to other forms of intellectual property right, and, indeed, to other rights such as exist under legislation about freedom of information and the reuse of public sector information (the problem of cumulation).
B. THE PURPOSE(S) OF COPYRIGHT
A fundamental question in thinking through systematic reform and codification is the purpose -or purposes -of copyright. Only with clear ideas of what we are trying to achieve will clear, coherent and principled law emerge.
(
1) Economic interests
Copyright's economic purpose, the incentivisation and rewarding, in accordance with market demand, of those involved in the creation and publication of certain kinds of work, is traditionally emphasised in the United Kingdom. 24 James
Purnell's speech in June 2005 shows that this idea is still dominant. In the European Union the rhetoric of the copyright reform process is also dominated by economic interests and the drive to complete the single market. These economic interests include, not only creators, but also entrepreneurs who convert what is created into products for the marketplace. Copyright is seen primarily as a response to market failure; without it, the expression of ideas and information, creativity and innovation would be available to all without reward for those who invested in the creation and dissemination of the works thereby produced.
However, the digital environment now raises the question whether the 26 There are of course issues about such matters as the equivalents to copyright term and exceptions in this model: these are dealt with below.
An obvious tricky point is that it is copyright, for the most part, which, at least initially, creates the subject-matter around which contracting parties can subsequently bargain. In the absence of copyright at the point of creation there might be no room for bargaining at all. In particular, the individual author/creator without access to the means of sophisticated technological protection, dissemination and online payment methods would be at a serious disadvantage without copyright. One could of course try to create some sort of "fair contract" or "minimum terms" regime for such authors, perhaps akin in some way to the the original production of the work or the product flowing from it. How far such investors may deserve the same level of protection as the originators of the work is a nice question: after all, they are risk-takers to a greater extent than those from whom they bought the rights, and they have helped to ensure that the author/creator/first producer does indeed earn reward from their work. We could of course ban outright transfers of copyright, 29 but licensing would still be necessary to secure the author's reward; while a licensee would certainly require some incentive in its own right to make the investment in a licence worthwhile.
Another economic interest is that of the employer whose employees create copyright works in the course of their employment, and who under United
Kingdom law (but not other Continental laws) gets first ownership of the resulting copyrights. Given that the employer is an investor who is backing the production of copyright works, his gaining the copyright (at least in its economic aspects) and the return therefrom does not seem so dreadful as sometimes suggested by those from systems more focused on copyright as reflecting more of personality rights than economic interests.
(2) Personality and cultural interests
Even in the United Kingdom, however, copyright's purposes are not limited to the protection and advancement of economic interests. The cultural dimension to 29 As with moral rights: see below, 000. 30 Compare the Software Directive art 2(3).with the Database Directive arts 4 and 11.
copyright is apparent in the nature of what it protects -literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, films, sound recordings and broadcasts -and in the length of time for which it gives that protection, which is not necessarily (or at all) driven by economic analysis. More subtly, the variable term as between author and media works also reflects cultural judgments, giving a higher value to "pure" authorship than to exploitation of technology. In any event, it is clear that the length of protection considerably exceeds what is needed to incentivise authors and producers, and that most works will have an economic life considerably shorter than their copyright terms.
But copyright's cultural purpose is most evident in the moral rights. These Inalienability means that these rights cannot be the subject of commerce in themselves; but under United Kingdom law, they may be waived, albeit this requires writing. Further, the paternity right must be "asserted" before it can apply, and it is not generally available to authors whose works are created in the course of employment. 33 In these ways, British moral rights are weaker than the systems found, for example, in some other EU member states.
The Commission working paper, however, consistently with the emphasis generally placed on the economic in European reforms, sees "no apparent need to harmonise moral rights protection at this stage". 
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The rights may be considered particularly significant in an online world where works can be speedily and endlessly transmitted and retransmitted, readily modified and re-shaped, and integrated, in whole or in part, in other works. Even if economic interests in the digital environment can be as effectively defended by way of contract as by copyright, it is much less clear that this is so with the moral rights, since it will not necessarily be the author who is making the product available to the public (contractually or otherwise).
A further argument draws on the link between moral rights and fundamental human rights which underlie many personality rights in general.
Human rights to dignity and respect seem particularly apt to support the right to be identified in connection with one's work and to have that work treated appropriately by others.  The copyright exceptions, whether general -e.g. fair dealing for private study, non-commercial research, or news reporting -or for specific types of work -e.g. decompilation of computer programs, "time-shifting" of TV broadcasts -reflect a recognition that certain non-producer interests outweigh producer ones in at least some circumstances; or at any rate the impracticability of certain kinds of copyright enforcement.
 The product embodying the protected work can generally be dealt with freely by the first and subsequent purchasers apart from integrity / commercial rental / lending rights.
Cumulatively, these aspects of the law amount to what is often called the "public domain". The advantage of a copyright law over a contractual regime is that it gives the notion of "public domain" some genuine consistency and coherence.
But in some ways "public domain" is an unhelpful phrase, since it can also be applied without abuse of language or law to material which is simply published or publicly available, whether or not it is also in copyright, and whether or not the user has to pay for its use. In thinking through the purposes served by copyright, however, the scope of the area which copyright does not reach, and the reasons (if any) why it does not do so, need to be part of the discussion and carefully weighed in the overall balance. Thus, for example, we need to address the argument that copyright exceptions exist principally to deal with market failures, areas of activity in which the creation of an efficient market where producers and users could bargain effectively seemed impossible or far too expensive; and that the Internet now provides the solution with hugely reduced transaction costs, making exceptions un-necessary. 42 In opaque and rather unsatisfactory fashion the Information Society Directive has tried to point a way forward for the time being, by granting member states the power to ensure that DRMS are not used to prevent those with lawful access to a copyright work from having the benefit of copyright exceptions and limitations. 43 It remains to be seen how effectively this power will be wielded, and whether the underlying principle can also be applied to prevent DRMS cutting off access to, and use of, out-of-copyright and other public domain material; but its existence is at least recognition that rights are not absolute, and that other interests are in play. To summarise the arguments of this section of the paper: the reform and possible codification of copyright needs to take account of all the interests involved in the law, and not simply the economic ones which seem to be in the forefront of official thinking, important and powerful though those are. In particular there is a need to engage with the personality-and culture-related claims of individual creators, and to recognise that the limitations hitherto placed upon copyright have served interests which are also important to the economic and cultural wellbeing of society as a whole. The status quo is not necessarily where we wish to remain; but it provides the platform upon which we should seek to build.
(4) Conclusion

C. CUMULATION ISSUES
Copyright sits alongside other forms of intellectual property right and the same subject matter can be potentially the subject of two or more rights. A codification of copyright has to decide how to address this problem. Should there be a rigorous scheme of one subject-matter, one right; or should overlap be permitted, and if so, to what extent, since the overlapping rights may in fact be contradictory, either as a matter of substance or in terms of the policies being pursued through the two regimes? Similar questions arise inside copyright itself, since it categorises different kinds of work in order (usually) to grant them different kinds of right.
1) Copyright and other intellectual property rights
The facts that copyright comes into existence with the relevant work (including possibly when the work is still in process of completion), and that as a result of the Berne Convention it takes a potentially world-wide effect for 50 years or more, but without any immediately necessary extra costs, makes it an enormously attractive right for investors of all kinds in new works. Thus at points where copyright may overlap with other forms of intellectual property, particularly where the other form requires registration, with its attendant costs (e.g. patents,
trade marks, registered designs), the would-be right-owner may well be tempted to prefer copyright; and where a court sees a deserving producer being "ripped off" by a copyist, copyright may be the readiest tool at hand with which to tackle the problem. "What is worth copying is worth protecting." own right alongside the more traditional three-dimensional kind. 58 While graphic design could have claimed protection under the old United Kingdom law as pattern or ornamentation if applied to a three-dimensional product, registration was denied to items of a primarily literary or artistic character where the article was no more than a carrier for the design. Copyright was expected to provide the necessary protection. So the pattern of words and lines on a football pools coupon was not a registrable design, since the paper which constituted the article to which the design was applied had no function other than to carry the design. 59 The result would now be different, even although the pools coupon also has copyright. 60 On the other hand the design applied to wallpaper, curtains, chair covers or bed linen would have been registrable under the old law and continues to be so now;
it also has copyright.
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Similar overlaps can arise with three-dimensional products within the scope of artistic copyright, such as sculptures, works of artistic craftsmanship and, perhaps most significant of all, works of architecture. The indeterminate word "item" which appears in the definition of "product" in the new law certainly does not by itself limit the concept to goods or corporeal moveables. Sculptures (but not works of artistic craftsmanship) were definitely excluded from registration 58 Designs Directive, art 1(b); Community Designs Regulation, art 3(b). Note that computer programs are specifically excluded from the definition of "product", so they are not eligible for a third form of IP protection. under the old law, but seem to epitomise a work of "handicraft" which can be protected under the new law.
The cumulation problems at the copyright/registered designs interface are addressed with in the United Kingdom legislation: first, by excluding copyright as far as possible; and, second, where copyright cannot be excluded, by aligning its results with those of registered designs law, again so far as possible. 62 In simplified terms, making an article to the design or copying another article made to the design is not an infringement of copyright; such production of articles is to be regulated under designs law. There is still difficulty: to have copyright the design must be embodied in a design document or model, and for these purposes design is defined as merely "any aspect of the shape or configuration (whether internal or external) of the whole or part of an article, other than surface decoration". 63 But, as discussed above, registered designs protection now reaches beyond three-dimensional shape or configuration, and it is therefore arguable that design features which are registered but which are not shape and configuration still also have full artistic copyright, even against three-dimensional RPC 6 (CA), an unregistered design right case where a similar question had to be addressed. A claim to full artistic copyright in the "trackways" of colouring in a retro track top (which had been denied unregistered design right because not shape or configuration) was also denied. Mance LJ dissented on a reading of the statute which is persuasive to this reader, at least; but Jacob and Sedley LJJ took non-shape/configuration features of a registered design are exploited, by or with the licence of the copyright owner, by making articles commercially, then the copyright period will not run for the usual author's lifetime plus 70 years. Instead the copyright so far as concerns making articles to that design will expire 25 years after the first marketing of such articles, that is, at the end of a period equivalent to the maximum time for protection under the registration system. 65 If, on the other hand, the infringing exploitation is non-commercial, registered designs law would not avail its owner in such circumstances, and copyright can be given its head.
The general issue here appears to be one of basic policy with regard to (2) Cumulation within copyright
There are also issues of cumulation within copyright itself. Many products in the copyright domain are likely to enjoy more than one copyright, often with each one having a different owner. Thus a book will have copyright as a literary work, but there will also be a copyright in its typographical arrangement, as would also be the case with printed dramatic scripts and musical scores. A database has copyright in the selection and arrangement of its contents, but this does not affect any copyright that items of content may have in their own right. A sound recording of a piece of music will involve copyrights, not only in the sound recording as such, but also, separately, one in the music. And if the work recorded is a song, there will be a further copyright in the song lyrics. 68 A broadcast of a film or sound recording will have copyright as a broadcast, but this will leave unaffected the generis right has failed to achieve its objective of boosting the global competitiveness of the European database industry (although the UK continues to be the leading member state in the field). It is understood that abolition of the right is one of the options under consideration by the Commission, along with revision of the Directive, or doing nothing, simply awaiting further judicial decisions (the last being the likeliest outcome) 67 Unless separate design protection was abolished altogether, which seems most unlikely. 68 There are also performers' rights to be considered, increasingly similar to copyright in content. In some contexts, such as popular music, the performer's contribution may be much more important to the success of a work than the composer of the music or the lyricist. copyrights in the film or sound recording. While the sound track accompanying a film is treated as part of the film for copyright purposes, a copyright may also subsist in the sound track as a sound recording.
The difficulty which arises from this is the variability of the copyrights which may exist in a product, meaning that while one element is in the public domain, issues of copies of old recordings, since that would also involve copying and issuing to the public works that were still in copyright (further, copyrights that presumably would often be held by the recording companies rather than the original authors). A question of policy may therefore be whether, when a product enjoys multiple copyrights, these ought to stand and fall together, at least in relation to products of the kind in question; and this, whatever the duration of the rights may finally be. In a number of recent cases the English courts have held that a work may belong to more than one of the categories into which works are divided in the copyright legislation. So, for example, electronic circuit diagrams have been held to be both literary and artistic works, 70 while a film has been held to be also a dramatic work. 71 As Laddie J has observed, this is a different point from the one that a single product may embody several copyrights:
[A]lthough different copyrights can protect simultaneously a particular product and an author can produce more than one copyright work during the course of a single episode of creative effort, for example a competent musician may write the words and the music for a song at the same time, it is quite another thing to say that a single piece of work by an author gives rise to two or more copyrights in respect of the same creative effort.
In some cases the borderline between one category of copyright work and another may be difficult to define, but that does not justify giving to the author protection in both categories. The categories of copyright work are, to some extent, arbitrarily defined. In the case of a borderline work, I think paper raises the possibility that the term for such works as a whole should always be calculated in relation to the last-surviving author. 73 which includes "every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression"; 74 this is followed by an illustrative list, while elsewhere, and only so to speak incidentally, the Convention refers to dramatic, musical and cinematographic works. 75 French law speaks of "works of the mind whatever their kind, form of expression, merit or purpose" and gives thereafter an illustrative list. 76 The principle of Occam's razor might usefully be applied:
categories are not to be multiplied un-necessarily in copyright law, and perhaps the present United Kingdom statute is guilty of that offence.
D. CONCLUSIONS
I want to conclude this paper with some comments on the potential for an academic contribution to the process of reform and possible codification with which I began. That contribution need not be confined to the fairly high-level questions to which I have been addressing myself. Nor need it limit itself to comment on the policy and other issues on which much further detailed research is required. What can be seen here is a set of academic projects which set out to influence the law, not as marginal critics on the sidelines, but as proponents of well developed alternative models; and which were available when the critical moment arrived and the Commission began to take the idea of a European contract law seriously. The Commission has evidently already begun to take a European copyright law seriously, so academic copyright lawyers may not have the luxury of the time that by chance was afforded to their contract colleagues.
But copyright projects akin to the Lando Contract Commission and the Study
Group on a European Civil Code are not unthinkable and would probably not need so much time, given the amount of research and knowledge that has already gone into comparative copyright law in Europe as a result of the various Directives on different aspects of the subject. There are models that can be followed, therefore, and opportunity exists in the form of the Seventh Framework programme. It is up to us now to seize the day.
